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INTRODUCTION 
The current state of protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) employees in the workplace is far from 
adequate.  Anywhere from 15–40% of gay and lesbian employees and 
nearly 90% of transgender employees have experienced 
discrimination or harassment at some point in their careers.1  Yet victims 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity must 
navigate a patchwork of federal, state, and local laws and regulations 
that often provide insufficient or no protection for employees.2 
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would remedy 
this inadequate regulatory scheme by creating a national standard of 
LGBT protection that prohibits employers from discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.  ENDA would 
provide employees with recourse for their employers’ discriminatory 
decisions regarding hiring and firing or wages, as well as any 
workplace harassment or other discriminatory treatment regarding 
the terms and conditions of employment.3  An overwhelming majority 
of Americans support a federal law banning such discrimination,4 
and ENDA has received bipartisan support in Congress.5 
                                                          
 1. Jeff Krehely, Polls Show Huge Public Support for Gay and Transgender Workplace 
Protections, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org 
/issues/lgbt/news/2011/06/02/9716/polls-show-huge-public-support-for-gay-and-
transgender-workplace-protections (noting that 44% of transgender individuals 
missed a job opportunity because of their status, while 26% percent lost a job and 
23% lost a promotion).  See generally Stuart Biegel, Unfinished Business:  The Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and the K-12 Education Community, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 357, 367 (2011) (documenting the history of discrimination against LGBT 
employees, both within the education sector and in the workplace generally). 
 2. Non-Discrimination Laws:  State by State Information—Map, AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2014) (mapping the various levels of LGBT protections offered 
under state non-discrimination laws).  Though many states, including California and 
Washington, protect LGBT employees from discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, a majority of states provide no LGBT discrimination 
protections.  Three states, including New York and New Hampshire, prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation but not gender identity.  Id. 
 3. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013). 
 4. Maggie Haberman, Poll:  Big Support For AntiDiscrimination Law, POLITICO 
(Sept. 20, 2013, 5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/poll-big-support- 
for-anti-discrimination-law-97540.html (citing a poll by TargetPoint Consulting in 
conjunction with the Americans for the Workplace Opportunity campaign indicating 
that 68% of registered voters across the country support federal legislation to protect 
LGBT Americans from workplace discrimination, including 56% of Republicans). 
 5. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Who Voted For the Employment Non-Discrimination Act?, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/11/07/who-voted-for-the-employment-non-discrimination-act 
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Critics of the bill argue, however, that antidiscrimination laws 
infringe on First Amendment rights when unaccompanied by 
exemptions for faith-based organizations with religiously-grounded 
objections to the conduct the antidiscrimination laws seek to protect.6  
These critics argue that under ENDA, religious organizations that 
object to homosexuality and transgenderism could be forced to 
employ individuals whose conduct is opposed to the organizations’ 
religious missions and beliefs.7  This criticism has led Congress to 
include a broad religious exemption allowing organizations that 
qualify as religious employers to discriminate against LGBT 
employees without regard to any of ENDA’s provisions.8 
This Note seeks to make sense of ENDA’s religious exemption, 
which is significantly broader than the religious exemption included 
in Title VII.  It recommends narrowing the scope of ENDA’s 
exemption to provide more comprehensive protections to LGBT 
employees while simultaneously safeguarding employers’ First 
Amendment rights.  Part I provides background on both Title VII 
and ENDA and their respective religious exemptions, which, 
although seemingly identical, apply to very different groups of 
employees.  Part II argues that ENDA’s religious exemption is 
overbroad because it allows religious employers to discriminate 
against LGBT employees even in cases where the discrimination is 
not based on a religiously-grounded objection.  Because the 
exemption provides employers with protection beyond that which is 
necessary to safeguard their First Amendment rights, it fails to 
appropriately balance the protection of religious freedom and the 
individual rights of LGBT employees.  Part III recommends that 
Congress amend ENDA’s religious exemption to allow religious 
                                                          
(describing the breakdown of the U.S. Senate vote to pass ENDA, which included ten 
Republicans in favor of the bill). 
 6. Steven H. Aden & Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Catch or Release?  The Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act’s Exemption for Religious Organizations, 11 ENGAGE:  J. FEDERALIST 
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, no. 2, Sept. 2010, at 4. 
 7. See, e.g., id. (contending that anti-discrimination laws such as ENDA are 
themselves discriminatory if they do not provide exemptions for employers with 
religiously-grounded objections to homosexual conduct because they would require 
religious organizations “to affirm conduct that is in diametric opposition to the 
moral principles of their faith”); Religious Activist Group Says ENDA Would Discriminate 
Against Christians, TAMPA BAY TIMES, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter 
/statements/2013 /dec/16/traditional-values-coalition/religious-activist-group-says-
enda-would-discrimin (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (discussing the Traditional Values 
Coalition’s claim that ENDA “discriminates against Christian daycare, Christian 
parents, Christian business owners, and the rights of religious freedom” because it 
does not provide an exemption for secular companies and organizations that are run 
by “committed Christians”). 
 8. S. 815 § 6; see infra Part II.A (describing ENDA’s broad religious exemption 
and its failure to safeguard the rights of LGBT employees). 
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employers to discriminate against only those employees who fall 
under Title VII’s ministerial exception, which allows religious 
organizations the freedom to discriminate in the hiring and firing of 
employees who publicly represent the religious views of the 
organization.  This Note concludes by explaining how the proposed 
amendment, though an imperfect response to the gap in coverage 
for LGBT employees, will provide an acceptable balance between 
protecting the individual rights of LGBT employees and the religious 
freedom of their employers. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Religious Employers and the First Amendment 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives religious 
employers the power to make religiously-based employment decisions 
free from government interference.9  The Amendment states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”10  The first clause of the 
Amendment, known as the Establishment Clause, prohibits the 
government from establishing a national religion or giving 
preference to one religion over another.11  Accordingly, a statute 
violates the Establishment Clause if it favors employers or employees 
of a particular religion, or favors religious employees over non-
religious employees.12  The Amendment’s Second clause, known as 
the Free Exercise Clause, requires that laws provide individuals and 
organizations with the freedom to exercise their religion without 
excessive government interference.13  Courts have interpreted the 
                                                          
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 1–2. 
 10. Id. amend. I, cl. 1. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (holding 
that a Connecticut statute violated the Establishment Clause where it provided 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their 
Sabbath, thereby “command[ing] that Sabbath religious concerns automatically 
control . . . all secular interests at the workplace”). Beyond the plain text of the 
Establishment Clause, the Clause has been interpreted to ensure that neither a state 
nor the federal government can, among other things, affiliate itself with any religious 
doctrine; pass laws that aid any particular religion; indicate a preference for religion 
to irreligion, or vice versa; or force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion.  16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 753 (2005).  The Clause is intended to protect 
against the support and involvement of the government in religious activity.  Id. 
 13. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (holding that, because the Free Exercise Clause “protects a 
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments,” 
the government is prohibited from involving itself in selection of church ministers); 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
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Free Exercise Clause narrowly to require religious organizations to 
follow neutral and generally applicable employment laws such as 
Title VII.14  The Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption 
from any governmental program unless inclusion in the program 
would prevent an organization from freely exercising its religion.15 
Courts have made a number of efforts to reconcile Title VII and 
other antidiscrimination laws16 with the Free Exercise Clause in order 
to provide religious organizations with more freedom from 
government interference.  The judicially created “ministerial 
exception” affords religious organizations free rein to select clergy 
without regard to any of Title VII’s protections.17  While courts of 
appeals have recognized a ministerial exception since the passage of 
Title VII,18 it was not until 2012, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. E.E.O.C., that the U.S. Supreme Court first 
                                                          
No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (holding that a secular, for-profit corporation 
cannot engage in the “exercise of religion” under the Free Exercise Clause); Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013) (determining that the 
New Mexico Human Rights Act does not violate the Free Exercise clause because its 
exemptions, which are common to a variety of laws, do not prefer secular conduct 
over religious conduct and do not evince any hostility toward religion). 
 14. See Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 
(quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 
(1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012), as recognized in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 3-4 (U.S. June 30, 2014)) (stating 
that free exercise claims will “fail if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the 
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and 
otherwise valid provision. . .” (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted)); 
see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (finding that because states are not required to 
accommodate otherwise illegal acts done to further religious beliefs, a state could deny 
unemployment benefits to a person fired for using peyote as part of a religious ritual). 
 15. E.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–04 
(1985) (holding that a church is not exempt from minimum wage and 
recordkeeping requirements because its religious objection is not to receiving any 
form of wages, but rather to receiving cash wages, which the law does not require). 
 16. See infra notes 37–38 (discussing antidiscrimination laws that have augmented 
Title VII by extending its protections to other minority groups). 
 17. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (holding that a “called” teacher was 
a “minister” covered by the ministerial exception, which is grounded in the First 
Amendment and which bars government interference with the internal governance 
of the church); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(determining that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not intend to allow the 
government to interfere in the relationship between a church and its ministers even 
though the statute did not state specifically that ministers were protected). 
 18. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
priest’s race discrimination claim was barred by a “ministerial exception” based on 
his religious duties and the nature of his dismissal); Natal v. Christian & Missionary 
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989) (exempting a not-for-profit religious 
corporation from the requirements of anti-discrimination laws on the grounds that 
“a religious organization’s fate is inextricably bound up with those whom it entrusts 
with the responsibilities of preaching its word and ministering to its adherents”).  The 
ministerial exception has also been applied outside of the Title VII context.  See, e.g., 
Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1210 (Conn. 2011) (finding that the 
ministerial exception applied to bar a school principal’s contract and tort law claims). 
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acknowledged the validity of this exception.19  In doing so, the Court 
reasoned that depriving the church of the power to select those who 
would personify its religious beliefs—a matter that is “strictly 
ecclesiastical”—violates the First Amendment.20  Although the 
ministerial exception covers all employers deemed to be religious 
corporations for purposes of Title VII,21 it appears to except only the 
hiring and firing of religious leaders and does not allow employers to 
discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment.22 
In applying the ministerial exception, the Supreme Court has 
declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee 
qualifies as a minister.”23  Instead, it considers all “circumstances 
of . . . employment,” including the employee’s formal title, whether 
the employee identifies him or herself as a minister, and whether and 
how much the employee engages in religious functions as part of his 
or her employment.24  The employee’s job title is not controlling, nor 
is the fact that an employee performs work that is primarily religious 
or primarily secular in nature.25 
                                                          
 19. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 (stating that the ministerial exception 
“precludes application of [employment] legislation to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers”). 
 20. Id. at 709 (citing Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox 
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)); see id. at 697 (“Requiring a church to 
accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, 
intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision . . . [it] interferes with the 
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs.”). 
 21. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text (explaining how the courts have 
interpreted the term “religious corporation”). 
 22. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the 
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it 
from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.” (emphasis 
added)); see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22745, RELIGION AND THE 
WORKPLACE:  LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AS IT 
APPLIES TO RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2011) (explaining that the 
ministerial exemption reconciles Title VII with the Establishment Clause because it 
allows churches to freely select their own clergy without endorsing discrimination as 
a basis for wage and compensation determinations). 
 23. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of 
Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the music director and pianist 
at a church was covered by the ministerial exception because he served an integral role 
at church services and helped to convey the church’s message to its congregation). 
 24. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707; see CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS22745, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 5 (2013) (breaking down the Court’s considerations 
concerning whether an employee qualifies as a minister into four factors:  formal title, 
substantive actions, understanding and use of the title, and religious functions performed). 
 25. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09 (holding that a title alone cannot 
“automatically ensure coverage” and that, although the amount of time an employee 
spends on secular duties is relevant to determining whether that employee is a 
minister, “that factor cannot be considered in isolation”). 
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Title VII’s exemptions for religiously-grounded hiring provide 
another means of tempering the statute’s effect on religious 
organizations.  Its exemptions allow religious employers to 
discriminate in the hiring and firing of employees whose religious 
beliefs do not align with those of the organization.  For example, 
under Title VII, a Catholic organization would be free to hire only 
individuals who hold themselves out as Catholic, regardless of 
whether those individuals will serve in a ministerial capacity.26  
Proponents argue that Title VII’s exemptions ensure the autonomy of 
churches and faith-based organizations.27  The Supreme Court has 
held that shielding religious expression from antidiscrimination laws 
“is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on 
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas,” 
including those regarding homosexuality and transgenderism.28  Title 
VII’s religious exemptions thus seek to bring the statute into accord 
with the First Amendment. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by 
covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin.29  It applies to federal, state, and local governments, 
as well as private employers with fifteen or more employees.30  With 
limited exceptions,31 Title VII applies only to employees who receive 
monetary compensation for their work.32  Over time, Title VII has 
been augmented by legislation prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy33, age,34 and disability.35 
                                                          
 26. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. N-915.016, RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATION EXEMPTION UNDER TITLE VII ¶ 235(1987). 
 27. See infra Part I.B (describing Title VII’s religious exemptions for religiously 
grounded hiring in depth). 
 28. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48, 656 (2000) (upholding the 
right of the Boy Scouts to dismiss an openly gay scoutmaster because his presence 
affected the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoints). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 2000e(b). 
 31. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (differentiating the 
case at hand, where the Court held that an intern who did not receive compensation 
for her work was not covered by Title VII, from Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising 
Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 221–22 (4th Cir. 1993), where the Fourth Circuit found that a 
volunteer firefighter who did not receive monetary remuneration but did receive 
indirect economic remuneration through a disability pension, survivors’ benefits for 
dependents, life insurance, and other benefits, was protected by Title VII). 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 119 (finding the plaintiff-intern outside Title VII’s 
protections because she received federal work study funding from her school, 
rather than her employer, and did not receive any employee benefits, such as 
health insurance or vacation time). 
 33. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
 34. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634). 
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Title VII allows private religious employers to discriminate in the 
hiring of employees whose religious beliefs do not align with those of 
the employer.36  It includes two separate exemptions:  a general 
exemption for religious employers37 and a more specific exemption 
for religious educational institutions.38  These exemptions derive 
from the First Amendment principles of free exercise and separation 
of church and state and serve as a check on Congress’s power to 
restrict private entities from freely engaging in religious affairs.39 
The first provision of Title VII’s religious exemption applies 
specifically to religious employers’ religiously-grounded hiring and 
firing decisions.40  The provision states that Title VII 
shall not apply to an employer with respect to . . . a religious corpo-
ration, association, educational institution, or society with respect 
to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to per-
form work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, as-
sociation, educational institution, or society of its activities.41 
The statute does not explicitly define “religious corporation,” and 
courts have broadly interpreted the phrase to include places of 
worship, religious educational institutions, and not-for-profit 
organizations with clear religious affiliations.42  Although courts have 
                                                          
 35. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12117).  Amending the iconic Civil 
Rights Act is no small feat.  After several failed attempts to do so, LGBT advocates 
have chosen to instead push for the passage of ENDA as an alternate means of 
providing equal rights to LGBT employees.  See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of 
ENDA, a Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209–10, 212–
15 (2008) (describing these failed attempts and explaining that proponents thought 
they would have a better chance at passing separate legislation).  ENDA, unlike Title 
VII, does not include a means for bringing disparate impact claims and does not 
address affirmative action.  Id. 
 36. Federal, state, and local governments are not covered under this exemption, 
since they may not, in accordance with the Establishment Clause, have any religious 
affiliation.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 
(1940) (declaring that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the 
Fourteenth] Amendment” includes the liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment, 
thereby applying the Establishment Clause against the states to prohibit them from 
establishing a state religion). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
 38. Id. § 2000e-2(e). 
 39. See supra Part I.A (discussing the relationship between the First Amendment 
and employment discrimination legislation). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1037 
(N.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that a Catholic hospital was exempt from the 
requirements of Title VII because it was religious in both “nature” (because the 
Catholic church supported and controlled it) and “atmosphere” (due to the regular 
practice of religious services and the fact that the building was “permeated with 
religious overtones”)); Gosche v. Calvert High Sch., 997 F. Supp. 867, 871 (N.D. 
Ohio 1998), aff’d, 181 F.3d 101 (1999) (allowing a Catholic school to terminate a 
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declined to apply the exemption to non-church affiliated 
organizations whose owners have strongly held religious beliefs, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.43 
could prompt a broader interpretation where a closely held 
corporation can show that it has a sincerely held religious objection 
to Title VII.44  In addition, courts have literally interpreted the 
exemption to include all activities of religious organizations as 
opposed to solely those activities that directly involve the exercise of 
religion.45  Although an organization that qualifies under the 
religious exemption is free to discriminate on the basis of religion in 
all hiring and firing decisions, it may not discriminate based on 
membership in any other class protected by Title VII.46 
The second provision of Title VII’s religious exemption is more 
specific in nature:  it allows religious educational institutions to take 
religious affiliation into account in the hiring and firing of personnel.  
The provision states: 
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, col-
lege, university, or other educational institution or institution of 
learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if 
[the institution] . . . is . . . owned, supported, controlled, or man-
                                                          
teacher for engaging in an adulterous relationship on the theory that a religious 
organization could condition continued employment on conformity to the religious 
standards of the church); EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154, 
1155, 1157  (W.D. Wash. 1992) (exempting from the protections of Title VII a 
Christian retirement home whose employee manual stated that “[e]mployees shall 
be persons who acknowledge the Christian purposes of Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. 
and agree to abide by and support them”). 
 43. No. 13-354 (U.S. June 30, 2014). 
 44. See infra notes 107–08 (discussing the Hobby Lobby decision and its 
implications for federal antidiscrimination laws like ENDA); Jillian T. Weiss, The First 
Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion, Nondiscrimination Statutes Based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, and the Free Exercise Claims of Non-Church-Related 
Employers, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 15, 46 (2010) (explaining that non-religious 
employers may not raise the Free Exercise Clause as a defense to neutral, generally 
applicable laws such as those prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity). 
 45. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339–40 (1987) (holding that a religiously affiliated 
non-profit organization may make employment decisions based on religion without 
violating the Establishment Clause, even if those decisions relate to nonreligious 
activities of the organization).  But see Duane E. Okamoto, Religious Discrimination and 
the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organizations:  A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper 
Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1377–79 (1987) (suggesting that 
there may be exceptions to the rule that Title VII exempts all activities of a religious 
organization because “neither the Act nor its judicial interpretation has provided a 
clear, definitive, or consistent standard concerning religious organizations’ statutory 
liberty to discriminate in employment”). 
 46. See BROUGHER, RELIGION AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining 
that an exempt religious organization can still violate Title VII if it considers an 
employee’s sex, race, color, or national origin). 
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aged by a particular religion or by a particular religious [organiza-
tion] . . . or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or 
other educational institution or institution of learning is directed 
toward the propagation of a particular religion.47 
Courts have generally required that religious organizations pass 
either a “control” test or a “curriculum” test to show that they fall 
under this provision.48  However, there is a limited amount of case 
law pertaining to the provision, in part because of its redundancy 
with the religious exemption’s first provision, which lists “religious 
educational institutions” as one type of religious organization.49  
Taken together, these two provisions provide religious employers the 
freedom to make hiring and firing decisions that take into account 
an individual’s religious background and beliefs. 
B. The Origins of ENDA and Its Religious Exemption 
1. Overview and legislative history 
ENDA, if passed, would prohibit employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.50  It would allow 
employees to sue their employers for discriminatory treatment in 
hiring, firing, promotion, or other terms and conditions of 
employment.51  Such discrimination could include, for example, 
refusing to hire an employee who is openly gay, terminating an 
employee who expresses his intent to undergo a gender transition, or 
failing to promote an LGBT employee to a management position 
where she would have greater public visibility.  Like Title VII, ENDA 
would apply only to employers with fifteen or more employees and 
would generally not apply to volunteers who receive no 
compensation.52  The bill’s stated purpose is 
                                                          
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 464 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (interpreting “curriculum” narrowly to mean “coursework and required 
school activities”).  Compare Myers v. Chestnut Hill Coll., No. 95-6244, 1996 WL 
67612, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996) (holding that a private Catholic college passed 
the “control” test because the church maintained its operations), with Siegel v. Truett 
McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (requiring an 
organization to have “extremely close ties” to organized religion to be considered 
under church control and thereby exempt from the requirements of Title VII), aff’d 
sub nom. 73 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 49. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 5 (speculating that the “paucity of 
case law” surrounding Title VII’s second religious exemption is related to the fact 
that many consider it redundant). 
 50. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (2013). 
 51. FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT:  FACT 
SHEET 1 (2013), available at http://www.familyequality.org/_asset/xh3z4t/ENDA-
Fact-Sheet-6.7.13.pdf. 
 52. S. 815 § 3(a)(1)(5). 
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to address the history and persistent, widespread pattern of dis-
crimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity 
by private sector employers and local, State, and Federal Govern-
ment employers . . . [and] to reinforce the Nation’s commitment to 
fairness and equal opportunity in the workplace consistent with the 
fundamental right of religious freedom.53 
Over the years, Congress has come close to passing several versions 
of ENDA, and the bill has undergone numerous changes designed to 
facilitate its passage.  U.S. Representative Bella Abzug sponsored the 
first gay employee rights bill in collaboration with the National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force during the 1970s.  In 1994, supporters of this 
bill reframed it as ENDA and offered it as an alternative to the gay 
civil rights omnibus bill under consideration in the House at that 
time.54  ENDA narrowed the scope of Abzug’s bill by limiting 
protection to the employment context.55  Although transgender 
advocates began lobbying gay and lesbian leaders to amend ENDA in 
the mid-1990’s,56 Congress did not introduce a trans-inclusive version 
of the bill until 2007.57  This bill was short-lived, as the House decided 
instead to consider a version limited to sexual orientation, which later 
passed in the House only.58  However, in 2009, trans-inclusive bills 
were introduced in both the House and Senate.59  Though some 
LGBT rights advocates have argued that a trans-inclusive ENDA is too 
extreme for many Americans and is the reason the bill has not yet 
become law, a consensus has developed among advocates that ENDA 
must include protection for LGBT employees.60  Thus, the 
transgender provision remains an important part of the current bill.61 
                                                          
 53. Id. § 2(1), (4) (emphasis added). 
 54. Task Force History, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org 
/about_us/history (last visited Aug. 14, 2014). 
 55. Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act:  It’s Past Time 
to Pass This Law, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 19, 2011), http://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/10006/a-history-of-the-
employment-non-discrimination-act. 
 56. Task Force History, supra note 54. 
 57. Id.; H.R. 3686, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2007) (forbidding employers from 
refusing to hire or discharging any individual due to the “individual’s actual or 
perceived gender identity”); id. § 2(a)(6) (defining “gender identity” as “gender-
related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related characteristics 
of an individual, with or without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth”). 
 58. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2007) (prohibiting employers from 
making hiring and firing decisions based on actual or perceived sexual orientation 
but declining to address gender identity); Task Force History, supra note 54. 
 59. Task Force History, supra note 54. 
 60.  Hunt, supra note 55. 
 61. See, e.g., Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road:  The Use and Misuse of 
History in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397, 397 (2009) (describing how, when U.S. Representative Barney 
Frank dropped protection for transgendered employees from the 2007 bill, many gay 
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On July 10, 2013, the Senate Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 
Committee approved ENDA by a 15–7 vote.62  When the bill came 
before the Senate, Pennsylvania Republican Pat Toomey proposed an 
amendment that would have expanded the religious exemption to 
religiously affiliated employers taking part in primarily secular 
activities.63  After rejecting this amendment and accepting by 
unanimous vote an amendment preventing government retaliation 
against religious organizations, the Senate approved ENDA on 
November 7, 2013.64 
2. ENDA’s religious exemption 
Much like the rest of the bill, ENDA’s religious exemption has 
undergone a number of modifications over the years.65  In the 110th 
Congress, Representative Barney Frank introduced H.R. 2015, which 
included a narrower exemption stating that ENDA “shall not apply to 
any of the employment practices of a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society which has as its primary 
purpose religious ritual or worship or the teaching or spreading of 
religious doctrine or belief.”66  When this bill died in committee, 
Frank introduced H.R. 3685, which defined a religious organization 
more narrowly as: 
(A) a religious corporation, association, or society; or 
(B) a school, college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning, if— 
                                                          
rights activists and national and local gay rights groups “demanded that gender 
identity be put back in the bill, guaranteeing its defeat for years to come”); John 
Aravosis, How Did the T Get in LGBT?, SALON (Oct. 8, 2007, 7:10 AM), http://www. 
salon.com/2007/10/08/lgbt (acknowledging that civil rights legislation, like other 
types of legislation, is a series of compromises, and advocating for the passage of a 
non-trans-inclusive ENDA on these grounds). 
 62. Lisa Milam-Perez & Pamela Wolf, ENDA Passes in Senate; Faces Tough Hurdle in 
House—Pending Legislation, HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. COMPENSATION GUIDE (CCH) 
2013, ¶ 32,682 (2013), available at 2013 WL 5963567; Chris Johnson, HISTORIC:  
Senate Panel Advances Trans-Inclusive ENDA, WASH. BLADE (July 10, 2013), http://www. 
washingtonblade.com/2013/07/10/historic-senate-panel-advances-trans-inclusive-enda. 
 63. See Sunnivie Brydum, In Historic First, Senate Approves ENDA, ADVOCATE.COM 
(Nov. 7, 2013, 1:53 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2013/11/07/breaking-
senate-approves-enda-initial-vote (quoting Senator Toomey, who said that “the 
agreement is that religious institutions, including those engaging in some secular 
activities, should be exempt from engaging in activities that contradict their religious 
beliefs”); see also infra Part I.B.2 (describing the religious exemptions in various 
versions of ENDA). 
 64. Brydum, supra note 63. 
 65. Some of the early versions of the bill include:  S. 1705, 108th Cong. 
§§ 3(a)(8), 9 (introduced Oct. 2, 2003); H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. §§ 3(a)(8), 9 
(introduced July 31, 2001); S. 869, 105th Cong. §§ 3(a)(8), 9(a) (introduced June 10, 
1997); H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. §§ 6(a)–(b), 17(9)(A)–(B) (introduced June 23, 1994). 
 66. H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6(a) (2007). 
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(i) the institution is in whole or substantial part controlled, 
managed, owned, or supported by a particular religion, religious 
corporation, association, or society; or 
(ii) the curriculum of the institution is directed toward the 
propagation of a particular religion.67 
Although the bill’s supporters maintained that the above definition 
of a religious organization was synonymous with that of Title VII, 
opponents argued that courts could interpret the language to exempt 
a smaller range of organizations than are exempt under Title VII.68  
Among the amendments offered in response to these concerns was 
one that would have significantly expanded the scope of the religious 
exemption to include organizations that “maintain a faith-based 
mission.”69  The House Labor and Education Committee rejected this 
amendment on the grounds that it was overbroad, given that the bill 
already “adopt[ed] Title VII’s definition of a religious organization 
and thereby import[ed] long-standing existing law on who is or is not 
a religious organization.”70 
However, some members of the religious community continued to 
oppose the definition of a “religious organization” by maintaining 
that the exemption would unfairly relieve seminaries and religious 
colleges from their obligations under ENDA while failing to exempt 
non-denominational faith-based colleges.71  In response, 
Congressman George Miller, co-sponsor of the bill, introduced an 
amendment that incorporated the language of Title VII’s religious 
exemption:  “This Act shall not apply to a corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society that is exempt from the religious 
discrimination provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
pursuant to section 702(a) or 703(e)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
1(a); 2000e-2(e)(2)).”72  Congressman Miller’s amendment passed, 
and this language appears in the current version of ENDA recently 
passed by the Senate.73  Congress has not attempted to clarify this 
                                                          
 67. H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(8) (2007). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 110-406, pt. 1, at 49 (2007) (noting that although the authors 
of H.R. 2015 intended to exempt a broader range of religious institutions than 
Title VII, the language of H.R. 2015’s religious exemption is “more prescriptive” 
than that of earlier versions). 
 69. Id. at 10. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 5 (describing the U.S. House of 
Representatives debate over the religious exemption of H.R. 3685 and the concern 
that it would exempt church-controlled colleges and universities based on 
denominational control but would not exempt a non-denominational Christian 
college such as Wheaton College in Illinois). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 110-422, at 3 (2007). 
 73. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013). 
DABROWSKI.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2014  12:38 PM 
1970 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1957 
language or to distinguish ENDA’s religious exemption from that of Title 
VII.74  Thus, should ENDA become law, its religious exemption will likely 
apply at a minimum to those organizations covered by Title VII, including 
religious corporations and faith-based educational institutions.75 
Presently, ENDA’s fate remains uncertain due to partisan politics.  
The bill is stalled in the House of Representatives, and House 
Speaker John Boehner has stated that he will continue to block it 
from coming to vote.76  While House Democrats could theoretically 
use a discharge petition to bypass Republican leadership, such a 
maneuver is used only rarely.77  Despite the existing political 
obstacles, ENDA enjoys broad support in the House:  it currently has 
202 co-sponsors, six of whom are Republican.78  While the current 
Congress is unlikely to pass ENDA, recent support for and momentum 
behind the bill suggest that it may become law in the coming years.79 
From its inception to its passage in the Senate, ENDA’s religious 
exemption has been a key component of the bill and has been crucial 
in garnering support from religious organizations.80  While it is clear 
that an exemption is politically necessary, it is less clear how courts 
                                                          
 74. See id. (providing no additional guidance on exemptions for religious 
organizations under ENDA). 
 75. See infra notes 88–101 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood that, 
in the case of ENDA, courts will find that the term “religious employer” covers places 
of worship, religiously affiliated non-profits, and religious educational institutions, 
and entertaining the possibility that courts will interpret the phrase even more 
broadly in light of policy concerns underlying ENDA). 
 76. Amanda Terkel, Harry Reid Predicts House Passage of ENDA If John Boehner Stops 
Blocking It, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2013, 3:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/11/05/house-enda_n_4218700.html (noting that Speaker Boehner believes 
the bill will lead to an increase in frivolous litigation and negatively affect small business). 
 77. A discharge petition is a legislative maneuver that would require the minority 
party to obtain 218 signatures to override the Speaker’s decision and force a floor 
vote.  See Justin Snow, Amid House Intransigence, Democrats Could Attempt to Force ENDA 
Vote, METRO WKLY. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2014/03 
/amid-house-intransigence-democrats-could-attempt-t.html. 
 78. Id.; see also Terkel, supra note 76 (“If [ENDA] came up for a vote in the 
House, it would pass.” (quoting Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid)). 
 79. See Haberman, supra note 4 (citing a 2013 studying finding that 68% of voters 
support the passage of federal legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity).  Furthermore, most large businesses have already 
shown their support for ENDA’s policy goals by putting in place their own 
discrimination policies:  88% of Fortune 500 companies have sexual orientation non-
discrimination policies, while 57% have gender identity non-discrimination policies.  
Dan Rafter, Nation’s Leading Businesses Support Employment Non-Discrimination Act as 
Senate Hearing Nears, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 9, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry 
/nations-leading-businesses-support-employment-non-discrimination-act-as-sen. 
 80. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009:  Hearing on H.R. 3017 Before 
the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 57–58 (2009) (statement of Rabbi David 
Saperstein, Director and Counsel, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism) 
(testifying that ENDA’s “exemption for religious organizations[] is an essential part 
of the legislation” because it “protect[s] the freedom of religious organizations with 
differing beliefs to practice their faith as they see fit”). 
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will interpret the exemption as written and whether ENDA will be 
effective in ensuring that LGBT employees are protected from 
discrimination in the workplace. 
II. ENDA’S RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION SHOULD ALLOW  
DISCRIMINATION ONLY IN CASES WHERE AN EMPLOYER’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE IMPLICATED 
Among ENDA’s stated purposes is this objective:  “[T]o reinforce 
the Nation’s commitment to fairness and equal opportunity in the 
workplace consistent with the fundamental right of religious 
freedom.”81  However, ENDA’s religious exemption provides employers 
with protections that extend beyond what is required by the First 
Amendment.  The exemption applies to all organizations that are 
exempt from the religious discrimination provisions of Title VII 
regardless of whether the discrimination in question bears any 
relation to the organization’s religious mission or beliefs.82  Thus, as 
written, ENDA’s religious exemption is overly broad because it allows 
employers to discriminate even in cases where employing LGBT 
individuals poses no conflict with the employer’s religious views.83  As 
a result, the exemption undermines the purpose of the law by 
eliminating coverage for a large group of employees. 
A. ENDA’s Religious Exemption Is Overbroad Because It Allows 
Discrimination Irrespective of an Employer’s Religious Beliefs or Its Employee’s 
Role in Conveying Those Beliefs 
ENDA’s religious exemption is significantly broader than that of 
Title VII because it allows a religious employer to discriminate against 
an LGBT employee without requiring the employer to show that the 
                                                          
 81. S. 815, 113th Cong. § 2(4) (2013).  This stated purpose, coupled with 
ENDA’s extensive religious exemption, suggests that ENDA’s drafters intended to 
afford religious organizations special discretion in the case of discrimination against 
LGBT individuals as compared with discrimination against women, minorities, and 
other protected groups.  See J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer?  Can A 
“Separate but Equal” Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment 
Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1553–54 (2000) (suggesting that ENDA’s broad 
religious exemption “sends a mixed message” because it claims to stamp out sexual 
orientation discrimination but excludes a large class of employers from its requirements). 
 82. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1153; see JODY FEDER & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40934, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 
IN EMPLOYMENT:  A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT 
(ENDA) 7 (2013) (arguing that ENDA’s religious exemption broadens religious 
organizations’ ability to discriminate in hiring beyond that provided by Title VII). 
 83. See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text (describing two scenarios in which 
the religious exemption applies to bar discrimination suits by employees who perform 
primarily secular job duties and play no role in preaching the message of the church). 
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discrimination is grounded in a religious objection.84  The exemption 
therefore provides employers with protections beyond those that are 
necessary to safeguard their First Amendment rights.  The exemption 
does not require discrimination to be consistent with the religious 
tenets of an organization, nor does it limit discrimination to employees 
holding religious leadership roles in the organization.85  Instead, it 
allows discrimination against LGBT employees irrespective of any 
religious objection or conflict with homosexuality or transgenderism.86 
Congress’s failure to include any limitations on ENDA’s religious 
exemption will result in a gap in protection for LGBT employees that 
will manifest in two likely scenarios.  First, ENDA allows religious 
employers to discriminate against LGBT employees even in cases 
where the employer has no religious objection to homosexuality or 
transgenderism.  By including a blanket exemption for religious 
corporations, ENDA leaves the door open for supervisors with 
personal biases against LGBT employees to make discriminatory 
employment decisions based on their own views rather than the 
tenets of the religion with which their employer is associated.  
Consider, for example, an applicant to a position at a religiously 
affiliated community center that has no stated objection to 
homosexuality.  If a hiring manager, without the knowledge or 
consent of the organization’s administration, were to refuse to hire 
the hypothetical applicant on the basis of sexual orientation, the 
employee would have no grounds for an employment discrimination 
suit because the community center would be exempt from coverage 
under ENDA.  Both the organization and the hiring manager would 
escape liability for discrimination even though the discrimination in 
question was completely unrelated to the organization’s religious 
mission and teachings.  Although this scenario may prove to be rare, 
discrimination based on personal bias is nonetheless an unintended 
consequence of ENDA’s religious exemption and could easily occur 
should ENDA pass in its current form. 
                                                          
 84. In contrast, in order to receive protection under Title VII’s religious 
exemption, an employer must show that the objection is based specifically on a 
religious objection to homosexuality and does not implicate another protected 
category.  FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 7. 
 85. Supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (noting the open-endedness of 
ENDA’s religious exemption, which adopts Title VII’s religious exemption in full but 
does not supplement it with clarifying language). 
 86. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 7 (observing that ENDA’s religious 
exemption “does not appear to limit the permissibility of religious organizations’ 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity to instances in which 
those factors may conflict with religious beliefs” and concluding that the exemption 
would therefore permit an organization to refuse to hire a gay applicant even if its 
religious teachings did not oppose homosexuality). 
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ENDA’s religious exemption also fails to distinguish between those 
employees who serve as religious leaders and those who engage in 
secular work or serve in non-leadership roles.  It allows employers to 
discriminate against employees without regard to whether those 
employees have any role in conveying the religious organization’s 
message or promoting its views, including workers who have little or 
no contact with congregants or members of the public.87  Take, for 
example, a line cook in the cafeteria of a religious school who spends 
workdays in the school’s kitchen and interacts very little with students 
and visitors to the school.  Because the work takes place behind 
closed doors, this employee does not play a role in conveying the 
organization’s message.  Yet, as currently written, ENDA’s religious 
exemption would allow school officials to fire or choose not to hire 
this individual based on his or her sexual orientation or gender identity. 
The exemption’s over-inclusiveness is not limited to employees 
who work behind the scenes.  While certain employees of religious 
organizations, such as receptionists and secular teachers, do have 
significant contact with church members and members of the public, 
they do not necessarily have any role in representing the religious 
organizations themselves.  Because these employees’ work-related 
duties primarily benefit the religious organizations’ secular activities 
rather than their religious missions, the organizations would have a 
difficult time demonstrating that ENDA’s protections infringe upon 
their First Amendment rights.88  Consider, for instance, a salesperson 
for a church-operated commercial enterprise who has substantial 
contact with the public on a daily basis.  Although this employee’s 
clients may not be aware that the employee works for a religious 
institution because his or her work is primarily commercial in nature, 
the institution would probably still be exempt from ENDA’s 
provisions because it would likely qualify as a religious corporation.89  
This example further illustrates that ENDA’s religious exemption is 
overbroad in that it allows discrimination beyond that which is necessary 
to guarantee employers the freedom to exercise their religious beliefs. 
Given the case law pertaining to Title VII’s religious exemption, it 
is unlikely that courts will effectively address these gaps in protection 
                                                          
 87. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1553 (observing that ENDA does not require that a 
particular sexual orientation or gender identity be a “bona fide occupational 
qualification” for a job in order to allow a religious employer to discriminate). 
 88. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305–06 (1985) 
(distinguishing between a church’s evangelical and secular commercial activities). 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 86–87 (explaining that no religiously-
grounded objection is required for a religious corporation to discriminate against 
an LGBT employee). 
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for LGBT employees.  The question of whether an employer is a 
“religious corporation” under the statute is always the threshold 
question for a court’s consideration when reviewing an allegation of 
employment discrimination.90  Once an organization demonstrates 
that it qualifies as a “religious corporation” under Title VII, the 
organization is exempt from the Act’s requirements concerning 
hiring and firing and is given broad discretion in making religiously-
grounded employment decisions.91  This safeguard, according to the 
Supreme Court, ensures that the organization has the freedom to 
exercise its religion without government interference.92 
Courts are likely to find that ENDA exempts organizations that 
would qualify as religious corporations under Title VII.  Given that 
ENDA adopts Title VII’s definition of a “religious corporation” in its 
entirety, it is possible, but highly doubtful, that courts will interpret 
ENDA’s exemption more narrowly than that of Title VII.93  Thus, at a 
minimum, courts will likely exempt places of worship, religiously 
affiliated non-profits, and religious educational institutions from 
ENDA’s requirements without regard for whether a particular 
instance of discrimination is necessary to protect an employer’s First 
                                                          
 90. See supra note 42 (listing cases in which the primary question for the court 
was whether the employer in question qualified as a religious corporation). 
 91. Supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330–
31, 337 (1987) (allowing, for the first time, a not-for-profit facility of the Mormon 
Church to discharge an employee for not being a member of the church); Zoë 
Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions:  A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory 
Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 161–62 (2011) (suggesting 
that the Amos court accepted as legitimate “Congress’s decision to accord religion a 
broad exemption from laws of general application”).  But see Spencer v. World 
Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 735, 737–41 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) 
(proposing three new tests for determining whether an entity qualifies as a religious 
organization under Title VII, including status as a not-for-profit entity, self-
identification as being organized for a religious purpose, and the organization’s 
engagement in activity “consistent with[] and in furtherance of[] [its] religious 
purposes”); id. at 741–42, 748 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (rephrasing Judge 
O’Scannlain’s test); Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Note, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious 
Organization Exemption:  Federal Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545, 547, 
554–59, 567 (2011) (describing the various tests historically used by courts to 
determine whether an employer may be considered religious and arguing that Spencer 
created greater uncertainty for organizations that seek to invoke the religious exemption). 
 92. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 339  (asserting that Title VII’s religious exemption 
“effectuates a more complete separation” of church and state and prevents 
unnecessary judicial inquiry into religious belief).  But see Robinson, supra note 91, at 
161 (arguing that Title VII’s religious exemption is a “solid example of Congress 
providing for religious free exercise beyond what is constitutionally required”). 
 93. In fact, it would be within the courts’ discretion to interpret the definition 
of a “religious corporation” more broadly in the context of ENDA.  See infra notes 
95–96 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that courts interpreting 
ENDA may not recognize those legal theories that have developed under Title VII 
and instead favor an interpretation of “religious corporation” that goes beyond the 
limits of Title VII’s definition). 
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Amendment Rights.94  In light of these gaps in coverage, it is 
inevitable that LGBT employees will continue to face discrimination 
at the hands of some religious employers. 
Courts may find that a larger category of organizations satisfies the 
definition of “religious organization” and is thereby exempt from 
ENDA’s requirements.  Because ENDA exists as stand-alone 
legislation separate from the Civil Rights Act, courts would be within 
their discretion to find that the policy concerns underlying ENDA are 
sufficiently distinct from those underlying Title VII to permit a 
broader interpretation of the definition of a “religious corporation” 
under ENDA.95  Indeed, courts could theoretically expand this 
definition to include even those employers that are unable to 
demonstrate a connection between the owners’ religious beliefs and 
the organization’s purpose or identity, such as a retail store that is not 
affiliated with a church or religious institution but whose owners have 
strongly held religious beliefs regarding homosexuality.96  The fact 
that courts do not uniformly recognize sexual orientation as a suspect 
class for the purposes of judicial scrutiny suggests that courts 
interpreting ENDA may take a less restrictive approach in defining 
the phrase “religious corporation.”97  Absent any guidance in the text 
of the Act, it is difficult to predict precisely how courts will resolve this 
                                                          
 94. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s broad 
interpretation of the term “religious corporation” in the Title VII context). 
 95. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 9 (suggesting that courts may 
conclude from the fact that ENDA was introduced as stand-alone legislation rather 
than as an amendment to Title VII that the two laws implicate different policy 
considerations); cf. Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1554–56 (noting that while the American 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act are both 
based on the same framework as Title VII courts have read these statutes very differently). 
 96. See Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1556 (providing an example of “a hypothetical 
employer whose customers are predominantly religious organizations” and suggesting 
that courts would be hesitant to find that this employer is subject to ENDA’s requirements). 
 97. The Supreme Court has declined to identify a level of scrutiny to be used in 
cases of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.  See United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693, 2695–96 (2013) (finding it unnecessary to use 
heightened scrutiny to hold the Defense of Marriage Act, a law restricting the federal 
interpretation of “marriage” and “spouse” to apply only to heterosexual unions, 
unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593–94 (2003) (holding that there is only a protected liberty 
interest in same-sex sexual activity, not a fundamental right to same-sex activity, and 
that the government needs a legitimate state interest to justify an intrusion into that 
right).  While the majority of lower courts continue to evaluate claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination using only rational basis review, a number of courts have 
used strict or intermediate scrutiny in such cases.  See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 
527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “when the government attempts to 
intrude upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals . . . the government must 
advance an important governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further 
that interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that interest”); Varnum 
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 895–96 (Iowa 2009) (finding that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect 
class and that laws concerning them are therefore subject to heightened scrutiny). 
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issue, but it is certainly within the realm of possibility that courts will 
interpret the term “religious organization” more broadly than they 
have in the context of Title VII.98 
Further complicating the matter is the Supreme Court’s 2014 
decision in Hobby Lobby, where the Court held that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)99 protects a closely held 
corporation’s right to deny its employees a federal entitlement to 
health coverage for contraceptives based on the religious objections 
of the corporation’s owners.100  RFRA, the basis of the decision, 
provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden “is the least 
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental 
interest.”101  The majority in Hobby Lobby held that the company was 
exempt from the contraception coverage provision because the 
provision required the company’s owners to “engage in conduct that 
seriously violat[ed] their religious beliefs.”102  The Court asserted that 
it is not within the discretion of the federal courts to consider 
whether a religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable; 
instead, the inquiry is limited to whether the belief is “sincerely 
held.”103  The Court’s determination was therefore based not on 
whether the contraception coverage provision imposed a substantial 
burden on the organization, but whether the company’s objection to 
the coverage was based on a sincerely held religious belief.104  
Although the Court addressed “the possibility that discrimination in 
hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious 
practice to escape legal sanction,” it did not directly reference ENDA 
or discuss how the decision would affect cases of discrimination 
against LGBT employees.105  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent lamented the 
“startling breadth” of the decision, suggesting that it would allow any 
corporation to obtain a RFRA exemption simply by showing that the 
law in question was in conflict with its religious beliefs.106  
                                                          
 98. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra, note 82, at 9 (asserting that without express 
statutory clarification, judicial elaboration will be needed to clarify the scope of the 
definition of “religious organization” as it relates to ENDA). 
 99. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb (2012)). 
 100. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 30, 2014). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)(b). 
 102. Hobby Lobby, No. 13-354, at 32. 
 103.  Id. at 35.   
 104.  Id.   
 105. Id. at 46. 
 106. Id. at 29 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Suppose an employer’s sincerely held 
religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the minimum 
wage . . . or according women equal pay for substantially similar work . . . ?”). 
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If the dissent’s fears are realized, Hobby Lobby could give courts the 
green light to extend RFRA’s protections to corporations posing 
religious objections to discrimination laws such as ENDA—regardless of 
any religious exemptions that might be included in those laws.107  
Because the Court has already found that RFRA applies to closely 
held corporations, these corporations could be exempt from ENDA’s 
requirements even though they are not explicitly included in its 
religious exemption.  Thus, even a narrower religious exemption will 
not guarantee protection for any LGBT employees in the event of a 
RFRA challenge.  However, this does not render ENDA’s religious 
exemption any less crucial.  In cases where RFRA does not bar the 
application of ENDA, a narrower religious exemption will ensure that 
courts have less leeway to expand the definition of a religious 
corporation.108  Furthermore, a narrower exemption will reaffirm 
Congress’s commitment to protecting individual rights in a post-
Hobby Lobby world. 
Thus, a number of factors will influence the courts’ interpretation 
of ENDA and its religious exemption.  Recent cases complicate this 
picture even further.  Without additional clarification by Congress, 
ENDA’s religious exemption is bound to lead to disagreement among 
the courts and confusion for plaintiffs attempting to bring 
discrimination claims.109  Part B of this Note will argue that by 
narrowing ENDA’s religious exemption, Congress could ensure a 
more predictable judicial response while upholding the purpose of 
the bill more fully. 
                                                          
 107. During oral arguments, Justice Kagan predicted that if employers’ free 
exercise claims were given deference, “you would see religious objectors come out of 
the woodwork with respect to all of these laws,” and referred to the “parade of 
horribles” that could result, including objections to anti-discrimination laws, Social 
Security contributions, or minimum wage requirements.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 14:3–9, 16:5–19, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 
(U.S. Mar. 25, 2014).  See generally Ruth Marcus, Ruth Marcus:  Supreme Court Hobby 
Lobby Ruling Could Start a “Parade of Horribles,” WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-supreme-court-hobby-lobby-
ruling-could-start-a-parade-of-horribles/2014/03/25/e803675a-b45e-11e3-8cb6-
284052554d74_story.html (discussing the issues and competing interests at stake in 
claims brought under RFRA). 
 108. In recognition of the need to expand ENDA’s protections for employees of 
religious organizations, a number of major LGBT rights groups have withdrawn their 
support for the bill following the Hobby Lobby decision on the grounds that its 
religious exemption is overbroad.  See Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw 
Support of ENDA After Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-
group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-decision. 
 109. See, e.g., Jasiunas, supra note 81, at 1554–56 (discussing how a law’s stand-
alone status affects how courts interpret its provisions). 
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B. Congress Should Amend ENDA’s Religious Exemption to Allow Employers 
to Discriminate Only in Cases Where Employees Would Be Exempt From 
Coverage Under the Ministerial Exception 
While it remains to be seen how courts will interpret ENDA’s 
religious exemption, one thing is certain:  LGBT employees will 
continue to be subject to discrimination by religious employers under 
the exemption as written.  Should ENDA become law, the only way to 
guarantee LGBT employees complete protection from discrimination 
will be to remove ENDA’s religious exemption entirely.  Removing 
the exemption would represent a significant step toward equality for 
LGBT people in the workplace and would pose little threat to 
employers’ First Amendment rights.  Sexual orientation and gender 
identity, like race and sex, are immutable characteristics that do not 
reflect a person’s character and do not necessarily bear any relation 
to his or her religious beliefs.110  Thus, just as Title VII prohibits 
religious employers from discriminating against individuals on the 
basis of race, sex, and national origin while respecting those 
employers’ First Amendment rights, ENDA can and should protect 
LGBT employees from such discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in the same manner.  Failure to 
provide these safeguards affirms that protecting employees from 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is 
somehow less important than protecting employees from discrimination 
on the basis of other immutable characteristics such as race and sex. 
However, removing the religious exemption from the bill is almost 
certainly a political impossibility.  Much of the bill’s support has been 
contingent on the inclusion of a broad religious exemption, and 
removing it entirely could prompt even the staunchest backers to 
withdraw their support.111  Therefore, in the interest of ensuring 
ENDA’s passage, it will be necessary to consider other options for 
extending coverage to a larger number of employees. 
Assuming some exemption should be granted to religious 
employers, it should be kept as narrow as possible to protect the 
rights of LGBT employees.  The drafters of ENDA modeled the bill 
closely after Title VII, and this decision suggests that it would be 
                                                          
 110. See Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals:  Why the Immutability 
Argument Is Necessary and How It Is Met, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 571 (2006) (arguing 
that sexual orientation is “a trait as immutable as race or gender” and basing this 
argument on a broad consensus of scientific research). 
 111. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing in depth the key role the religious exemption 
has played in garnering support for ENDA); see also Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, 
at 4 (noting that ENDA draft bills have routinely included an exemption for religious 
organizations to protect the rights of these organizations to express their religious views). 
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appropriate to craft a religious exemption for ENDA that is consistent 
with that of Title VII rather than one that merely adopts Title VII’s 
language.112  If Congress chooses to include a religious exemption in 
ENDA, it should enact a narrow exemption that allows religious 
employers to discriminate against LGBT employees only in cases 
where the ministerial exception would apply in the Title VII context.   
Congress could accomplish this change in a number of ways.  The 
House could introduce an amendment, either prior to passage of the 
bill or following its passage.  Alternatively, Congress could wait for the 
courts to interpret the bill once it has been signed into law and 
respond with an amendment nullifying any negative precedent, as it 
did in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio.113  In other words, if Congress disagrees with the 
result of the courts’ interpretation of ENDA, it could expand the 
religious exemption retroactively.  In either case, Congress should 
amend ENDA to state that, applying the Supreme Court’s language 
in Hosanna-Tabor, any employee with “a role in conveying the 
Church’s message and carrying out its mission” will be exempt from 
ENDA’s coverage.114  This approach will provide an acceptable 
                                                          
 112. See FEDER & BROUGHER, supra note 82, at 1 (describing ENDA as “[p]atterned 
on” Title VII and noting that ENDA, like Title VII, will be enforced by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission).  As discussed, although ENDA adopts in full 
the language of Title VII’s religious exemption, the result is an exemption that 
applies to a much broader category of employees.  See supra Part II.A (explaining why 
ENDA’s religious exemption is effectively much broader than that in Title VII despite 
using the same language). 
 113. 490 U.S. 642, 650–51, 659, 661 (1989) (holding that, in determining the 
legitimacy of a disparate impact claim, “the proper comparison [is] between the 
racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the 
qualified . . . population . . . in the relevant labor market,” a decision that made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims (alterations in original) 
(internal quotations omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (2012), as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded the scope of 
the legal protections for employees and essentially nullified the Wards Cove decision.  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; see Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact:  
The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 247, 253 (2005) (explaining how the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed parts of the 
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of disparate impact claims by making an 
exception to the Wards Cove analysis “for criteria that are not capable of separation 
for analysis” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  A similar approach could be 
useful in the case of ENDA because it would allow the courts to weigh in on the law 
prior to Congress amending it.  In addition, opponents of the amendment might be 
more inclined to support it after observing the negative effects of an expansive 
judicial interpretation of the religious exemption. 
 114. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 
694, 708 (2012) (holding that because the plaintiff’s job duties consisted of 
“transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation,” she was covered by the 
ministerial exemption). 
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balance between protecting employers’ religious freedom and 
employees’ individual rights. 
Adopting the ministerial exception will give religious employers 
the ability to select clergy free from government interference while 
providing LGBT employees the same level of protection as employees 
who experience discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national 
origin.  Although this exemption is significantly narrower than 
ENDA’s current language, it adequately exempts all of those 
employees who have a role in preaching the message and teachings 
of a religious organization and whose protection under ENDA would 
therefore implicate First Amendment rights.  In addition to covering 
all of those employees commonly thought of as ministers, the 
ministerial exemption has generally been held to cover teachers at 
religious schools, choir directors, and other employees whose jobs 
require them to openly express the organization’s message.115  The 
formal job title itself is not decisive, and courts analyzing claims 
under the ministerial exemption also consider the practical role of 
the employee and the extent to which an employee holds herself out 
as a religious representative of the church.116  An employee may be 
considered a minister within the meaning of the ministerial 
exemption even if her job duties are primarily secular.117  Therefore, 
this exemption sufficiently protects the free exercise rights of 
religious employers because it allows those employers to be selective 
in choosing religious leaders while at the same time providing full 
protection for those employees who do not serve in leadership roles. 
Beyond political necessity, there are a number of benefits to 
narrowing ENDA’s religious exemption rather than removing it from 
the bill entirely.  Giving religious employers the ability to discriminate 
                                                          
 115. See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 177–78 (5th Cir. 
2012) (exempting from the requirements of the ADA and the ADEA a music director 
and pianist who made “unilateral, important decisions regarding the musical 
direction at Mass”); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192, 1195, 1201 
(Conn. 2011) (holding that the ministerial exception barred a former school 
principal’s tort and contract law claims); Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. 
Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d. 433, 434 (Mass. 2012) (concluding that 
a teacher at a Jewish Sunday school was covered by the ministerial exception and 
thereby exempt from bringing a claim of age discrimination).  But see Archdiocese of 
Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659, 660, 665–66 (Md. 2007) (holding that the 
ministerial exception did not apply to a church organist who had no discretion in 
choosing the music he played, did not lead choirs or teach hymns, and was not 
required to have any religious training). 
 116. See supra notes 18–20 (laying out factors courts have considered in 
determining whether an employee falls under the ministerial exception). 
 117. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708–09 (noting that even the heads of 
congregations generally have a mix of secular and religious duties and asserting that 
these circumstances do not preclude them from falling under the ministerial exception). 
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in the hiring and firing of religious leaders will help ensure that 
ENDA is not struck down by the Court for violating religious liberties, 
since the exemption would prevent the government from interfering 
with an employer’s right to select clergy who represent its faith.118  
This approach will also help to shield ENDA from attack under 
RFRA.  Though such an attack is probable given that the Court found 
that RFRA applied in Hobby Lobby, courts will be less likely to find that 
ENDA substantially burdens the free exercise of religion if it contains 
at least some religious exemption.119  Because the language and 
purpose of ENDA so closely mirror those of Title VII, courts are likely 
to look to the growing body of case law surrounding Title VII’s 
ministerial exception when interpreting a similar exception in ENDA.  
Thus, implementation of the proposed religious exemption should 
be relatively straightforward, as judicial disagreement will likely be 
limited primarily to that which currently exists in the Title VII 
ministerial exception context.120  Finally, a narrower exemption will 
afford religious employers discretion in hiring and other employment 
practices while at the same time giving them an incentive to provide 
antidiscrimination training for their workers and to develop clearly 
stated policies concerning discrimination against LGBT employees.121 
Moreover, as it is currently written, ENDA’s religious exemption 
does nothing to serve the needs of the vast majority of religious 
employers because these employers have no intention of 
discriminating against LGBT employees.  A large number of religious 
organizations have supported ENDA, both in its current form and in 
previous forms.122  Respect for the dignity of all people is the basis for 
                                                          
 118. See Aden & Carlson-Thies, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that critics of ENDA have 
argued that its protections “inevitably clash with the right to free exercise and 
expression of religion, including the right to believe and express that homosexual 
conduct is sinful”).  See generally Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-
Realization:  First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 189, 340–47 (1999) (outlining the First Amendment concerns for religious 
organizations implicated by anti-discrimination laws). 
 119. See supra notes 107–08 (discussing possible implications of Hobby Lobby); Corp. 
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 345 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such an exemption demarcates a sphere 
of deference with respect to those activities most likely to be religious.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to 
adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”). 
 121. Cf. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, S. 815:  EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 
2013 3 (2013), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments 
/s815.pdf (predicting that the costs associated with modifying emplo yment 
procedures in response to ENDA would be limited to updating employment manuals 
and building on training procedures already in place). 
 122. A coalition of religious advocacy organizations has declared their support for 
ENDA, stating that they “[could not] tolerate arbitrary discrimination against 
millions of Americans just because of who they are.”  FCNL and Faith Organizations 
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every major religion, and even those religions that are openly 
opposed to homosexuality and transgenderism generally do not 
condone discrimination based on basic human rights principles.123  
Religious employers may well decline to exercise their right to 
discriminate against their employees based on these principles, which 
would suggest that ENDA’s expansive religious exemption has more 
to do with politics than with religious opposition.124  In addition, 
irrespective of any religious objections, not all religious organizations 
will be willing to outwardly condemn their employees’ behavior.  
Religious corporations that are not diametrically opposed to 
homosexuality and transgenderism will be unlikely to make a claim of 
religious opposition and risk losing the support of their members.125  
Thus, only a narrow religious exemption is needed to protect the 
rights of LGBT employees from the small number of employers who 
would engage in this type of discrimination. 
ENDA’s current religious exemption is unprecedented and 
excessive, and it illustrates Congress’s willingness to prioritize the 
rights of employers over the protection of employees’ individual 
liberties.  Furthermore, the exemption does not effectively represent 
the interests of the majority of religious organizations, most of which 
would choose not to discriminate if given the opportunity.  An exemption 
that mirrors the ministerial exception applied in the Title VII context 
                                                          
Support the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, FRIENDS COMM. ON NAT’L LEGISLATION 
(July 15, 2010), http://fcnl.org/issues/discrimination/fcnl_and_faith_organizations 
_support_the_employment_nondiscrimination_act.  These groups include the 
Alliance of Baptists, the American Jewish Committee, Catholics in Alliance for the 
Common Good, Muslims for Progressive Values, the Episcopal Church, the Sikh 
Coalition, the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, the United Methodist 
Church—General Board of Church and Society, and many others.  Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Christopher Kaczor, Seven Principles of Catholic Social Teaching, 
CATHOLIC.COM, http://www.catholic.com/magazine/articles/seven-principles-of-catholic 
-social-teaching (last visited Aug. 15, 2014) (“The foundation for Catholic social 
thought is the proper understanding and value of the human person.”); Seven Themes 
of Catholic Social Teaching, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org 
/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/seven-themes-of-
catholic-social-teaching.cfm (last visited June 25, 2014) (asserting that the basic rights 
of workers must be respected if the dignity of work is to be protected). 
 124. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Religious Exemptions at Center of ENDA Debate, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/11/01/religious-
exemptions-at-center-of-enda-debate (discussing the political maneuvering 
surrounding the ministerial exemption, including Senator Rand Paul’s suggested 
amendment that would exempt any for-profit business that alleged that hiring LGBT 
people would “burden the employer’s exercise of religion”). 
 125. See supra note 122 (listing numerous religious advocacy groups that have 
declared their support for ENDA).  For example, 74% of Catholic voters are in favor 
of workplace protections for gay and transgender employees.  Krehely, supra note 1.  
Thus, it may be in the interest of Catholic institutions to align themselves with their 
own employees by supporting ENDA’s protections. 
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represents a better compromise between protecting the First 
Amendment rights of employers and the civil rights of LGBT employees. 
Although ENDA will provide essential protections to LGBT 
employees, there is no evidence that it will significantly increase the 
amount of litigation in federal courts.  Critics of ENDA have warned 
that expanding the bill’s scope will lead to an increase in both valid 
and frivolous claims that could create a substantial burden for small 
businesses.126  However, the existing data from states that have already 
passed legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity suggests that this supposed flood of 
frivolous discrimination suits has no basis in reality.  A recent General 
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that these states have seen 
no significant increase in litigation since the passage of 
antidiscrimination laws.127  The report found that LGBT employees 
are bringing discrimination claims under these statutes at 
approximately the rate at which employees bring federal claims 
under Title VII.128  There is consequently nothing to suggest that a 
federal law would have the effect of increasing litigation to the point 
of threatening any employer’s ability to stay in business.  On the 
contrary, the GAO report suggests that state antidiscrimination laws 
are in fact serving their intended purpose:  to allow LGBT employees 
a means of redress for discrimination in the workplace. 
Though few argue that gay and transgender employees should be 
denied equality in employment, ENDA’s legislative history has been 
filled with frustration and compromise.  Congress intended the religious 
                                                          
 126. In announcing his opposition ENDA, House Speaker John Boehner stated 
that the bill “will increase frivolous litigation and cost American jobs, especially small 
business jobs.”  Spinning ENDA, FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2013/11 
/spinning-enda (last updated Nov. 7, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. By way of an example, California has enacted statutory provisions protecting 
against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12490(a) (West 2014).  Of the total 19,839 employment 
discrimination complaints filed in 2012, only 1104 contained allegations of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-13-700R, UPDATE ON STATE STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DATA ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 1–
2 & n.4 (2013) (listing the twenty-two states that have enacted legislation against 
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and the eighteen states that have 
also added legislation against employment discrimination based on gender identity). 
 128. See UPDATE ON STATE STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT DATA, supra 
note 127, at 2 (reporting that generally, administrative complaint data collected from 
states with laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity showed “relatively few employment discrimination complaints” from LGBT 
employees (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Spinning ENDA, supra note 
126 (debunking John Boehner’s claim that ENDA will burden small businesses by 
encouraging frivolous litigation based on the above GAO report and the fact that the 
bill exempts employers with fewer than fifteen employees, which account for nearly 
90% of small businesses). 
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exemption to be a minor exception to the rule created by ENDA, but 
the exemption’s excessive scope calls into question Congress’s 
commitment to protect the rights of LGBT employees.  Congress could 
reaffirm this commitment by narrowing the Act’s religious exemption to 
allow discrimination against only those employees who qualify as 
religious leaders under the ministerial exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite having bipartisan support in Congress, ENDA’s immediate 
future remains uncertain thanks to partisan politics that have 
impeded its progress in the House of Representatives.129  However, 
the broad support and recent momentum behind the bill strongly 
suggest that it will become law in the coming years.  Though the 
passage of ENDA in any form will be a huge step toward guaranteeing 
LGBT employees equal rights in the workplace, its overbroad 
religious exemption leaves a major gap in coverage for employees of 
religious organizations.  Congress should amend ENDA’s religious 
exemption to apply only to employees who fall under the ministerial 
exception established in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. E.E.O.C.  Though far from a perfect solution, narrowing 
ENDA’s religious exemption offers an acceptable balance between 
protecting the civil rights of LGBT employees and ensuring the 
religious freedom of employers. 
                                                          
 129. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing ENDA’s current 
status in the House). 
